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Canaries in the Mineshaft of American Democracy: North American
Settler Genocide in the Thought of Raphaël Lemkin
Michael Bryant

Bryant University
Smithfield, Rhode Island, USA
The Indian plays much the same role in our American society that the Jews played in
Germany. Like the miner’s canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison
gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians…reflects the rise and fall
in our democratic faith.
- Felix Cohen (1953)

We all want to think well of ourselves. This truism applies to societies as well as to their individual
citizens. In the United States, belief in American exceptionalism has sometimes produced
outlandish assertions, as when the US solicitor general, in blithe disregard of centuries of slavery
and the annihilation of Indian tribes, proclaimed in 1952 that “genocide has never existed in this
country. Under our form of government, it can never exist.”1 For rosy optimism, this verdict far
transcends even Whiggish history, which for all its faith in the march of progress nonetheless
concedes the existence of evil, if only as a minor pothole along an improving road. The Panglossian
cheerfulness of the solicitor general is not unusual in US history. Similar attitudes abound in every
era of the American past, nourished by a “bardic tradition”2 of historical writing that glorifies
European expansion across the North American continent while ignoring or minimizing its human
cost. Thus, two of the leading historians of the USA, George Bancroft and Arthur Schlesinger, each
writing at moments separated by 158 years, could extol the country’s settlement as a victory over
“feeble barbarians” (Bancroft in 1834) and “primitive tribes” (Schlesinger in 1992). In 2008, former
US officials in the Clinton administration, including ex-Secretary of State Madelaine Albright,
wrote with eyes firmly clenched shut on American history that genocide “threatens not only our
values, but our national interests.”3
Reluctance to confront national crimes is not unique to the USA. Despite the aim of the Canadian
Museum for Human Rights of “exploring human rights with a special reference to Canada,” and
despite endorsing Canada’s recognition of five genocides in world history, the Museum does not
consider the colonization of Canada genocidal. Native American critics of its view like Phil Fontaine,
the ex-grand chief of the Assembly of First Nations, have not budged the Museum from its position.4
The tendency of Canadian officials to deny the occurrence of genocide on their own soil has recently
surfaced in the debates over the report on missing and murdered indigenous women. In response
to the extraordinary numbers of Indian women and girls who have been either murdered or have
disappeared in Canada between 1980 and 2012, the Canadian government appointed a “National
Inquiry into Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women and Girls” in 2016 to investigate the matter.
In their report of June 3, 2019, the four commissioners who formed the National Inquiry charged
that “state actions and inactions rooted in colonialism and colonial ideologies”5 had enabled mass
murder and were tantamount to genocide, an accusation greeted with pushback from government
officials. Neither Prime Minister Justin Trudeau nor Premier François Legault were willing to call
the government’s sins of omission and commission “genocide.” Legault bluntly rejected the term
as applied to the murders and disappearances. While admitting the government had failed in its
1

“US Statement on the Civil Rights Congress Publication We Charge Genocide!” American Jewish Archive, 60/4/7, quoted
in Anton Weiss-Wendt, The Soviet Union and the Gutting of the U.N. Genocide Convention (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 2017), 228.
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Andrew Woolford et al., introduction to Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, in Book Title, ed. Andrew Woolford
et al. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014), 8.
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National Inquiry into Murdered and Missing Indigenous Women and Girls, Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report
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wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_1a.pdf (accessed August 12, 2019).
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duties to protect native victims, he hastened to add that “genocide is something else,” and went on
to equate genocide with sensational government-initiated and administered mass killings like the
Rwandan and Nazi holocausts. Conceding the seriousness of the violence as well as governmental
nonfeasance in responding to it, Legault insisted the crimes did not fulfil the legal definition of
genocide under international law: “A genocide is when someone wants to systematically cause a
nation to disappear. I don’t think we’re talking about that.”6
Remarkably, we sometimes encounter such attitudes among Holocaust and genocide scholars
in their views on whether Euro-American treatment of native peoples was genocidal. Advocates
of the view that it was genocide include Alfred Cave, Benjamin Madley, Ben Kiernan, Gray
Whaley, Tasha Hubbard, and most recently Laurelyn Whitt and Alan W. Clarke;7 among the
dissenters are Guenter Lewy, Gary Clayton Anderson, Joseph Gone, and Steven Katz.8 Indigenous
scholars also stake out antipodal positions on the issue of North American genocide. Some are
chary of attaching the label of “genocide” to Euro-native relations for fear that this act of naming
will deprive indigenous peoples of agency, reducing them to passive victims of overwhelming
European aggression.9 The word’s connotation of merciless death-dealing obscures native people’s
“survivance”10 of Euro-American mistreatment and the sustained efforts to destroy their cultures.
The ability of indigenous people to withstand such assaults is a subject of pride for many of them
today. To quote a line from William Faulkner’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, native Americans
“have not only endured but prevailed.”11
In virtue of the legal origins of genocide as a crime under international law, debates over the
applicability of the term to the North American frontier and Euro-American expansion quickly
become legalistic. This is strikingly evident in Steven Katz’s refusal to treat settler-Indian relations
as an instance of genocide. For Katz, the disappearance of the native peoples of the Americas was
attributable to epidemic disease, a force of depopulation that was “unwitting” and at variance with
6

“MMIWG: Legault promises swift action based on report’s recommendations,” accessed August 12, 2009, https://
montrealgazette.com/news/quebec/mmiwg-legault-promises-swift-action-based-on-reports-recommendations.As
will become clear in the course of this article, the participants in the recent Canadian debate might be astonished by
Raphaël Lemkin’s willingness, were he alive today, to consider events like unofficial attacks on indigenous women
and girls as genocide even when they do not satisfy the strict elements of the offense under the Genocide Convention.

7

Alfred A. Cave, Lethal Encounters: Englishmen and Indians in Colonial Virginia (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2011); Benjamin
Madley, “Reexamining the American Genocide Debate: Meaning, Historiography, and New Methods,” American
Historical Review 120, no. 1 (2015), 98-139; Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination
from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 310-363; Gray H. Whaley, “American Folk Imperialism
and Native Genocide in Southwest Oregon, 1851-1859,” in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America (Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 2014), 131-148; Tasha Hubbard, “Buffalo Genocide in Nineteenth-Century
North America: ‘Kill, Skin, and Sell’,” in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America (Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 2014), 292-305; Laurelynn L.Whitt and Alan W. Clarke, “Bringing it Home: North American
Genocides,” The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 20 (2017), 263-348.
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Guenter Lewy, “Were American Indians the Victims of Genocide?,” Commentary, no. 2 (2004), 55-63; Gary Clayton
Anderson, Ethnic Cleansing and the Indian: The Crime that Should Haunt America (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 2014); Joseph P. Gone, “Colonial Genocide and Historical Trauma in Native North America: Complicating
Contemporary Attributions,” in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, ed. Andrew Woolford et al. (Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 2014) 273-291; Steven V. Katz, “The Pequot War Reconsidered,” New England
Quarterly 64, no. 2 (1991), 206-224; idem, “The uniqueness of the Holocaust: the historical dimension,” in Is the
Holocaust Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide, ed. Alan S. Rosenbaum (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).ims
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Genocide in Indigenous North America, 12.
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“Survivance” is a term used by the Anishinaabe writer Gerald Vizenor in Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian
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Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, 12.
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the “expressed and self-interested will of the white empire-builder or settler.”12 Katz buttresses his
view with the insistence (found in his discussion of the Pequot War) that the American colonists
harbored no genocidal intention during or after conflict with native peoples.13 The issue of intent,
along with protected class, is a touchstone in parsimonious interpretations of genocide because it is
an essential element of the crime as set forth in the UN Genocide Convention of 1948. If the accused
neither attacked a protected group (racial, religious, ethnic, or national) nor possessed the specific
intent to destroy “in whole or in part” the members of the group, then no genocide may be said to
have occurred.
The refusal of Katz and other skeptics to acknowledge genocide in Euro-American/Indian
relations seems still more enigmatic when the context of these relations is considered. That context
was settler colonialism, a distinctive type of European colonialism in which the potential for
genocide is always present. As genocide scholar John Docker has noted, the term “settler colony”
is less common in US than in non-US historiographies. It signifies “a colonial society where the
indigenous population was reduced to a small or tiny proportion of the overall population, whose
majority population becomes composed of colonizers/migrants.”14 Docker classifies South Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the USA as settler colonies. For Whitt and Clarke, settler
colonies simmer with the potential for genocidal eruptions.
Unlike colonialism, “settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends.” [citing
Edward Cavanagh & Lorenzo Veracini] Settler colonizers “come to stay.” While within
colonialism, the Indigenous colonized population is indispensable, most commonly as a
source of exploitable labor, within settler colonialism, the Indigenous population is not only
imminently dispensable, but pressingly so as an obstacle to land acquisition. …This is a
“winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement…”15

“The logic of this project,” according to Whitt and Clarke, can and often does lead to
genocide. In seeking the removal of the indigenes and their supersession by European settlers,
settler colonialism inevitably provokes resistance from native peoples. At this point, the process of
dispossession enters a period of “crisis,” and the new tense phase of the colonial project may slide
toward radical solutions. Native resistance elicits counter-insurgency in the form of massacres and
exterminatory wars supplemented with removals, imprisonment, starvation, allotment, boarding
schools, and other techniques of cultural liquidation.16 The triad of domination, resistance, and
genocide is a veritable natural law of settler genocides, a pattern that structures nearly every
instance of violence against native peoples in settler-colonial societies.
12

Katz, The uniqueness of the Holocaust, 21. Similarly, genocide scholars Michael McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses argue that
disease was decisive in the annihilation of the American Indian. Michael McDonnell and A. Dirk Moses, “Raphael
Lemkin as historian of genocide in the Americas,” in The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a historian of mass
violence, ed. Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 73. For a critique of
the disease hypothesis, see Whitt and Clarke, Bringing it Home, 273.
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Katz, The Pequot War Reconsidered, 291. Katz, as well as noted Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer, are strenuous defenders
of the “uniqueness” thesis that the Holocaust was incomparable, thereby privileging the Holocaust as the preeminent
genocide in world history. For a discussion of the uniqueness thesis in relation to the debate over North American
genocide, see Woolford et al., Introduction to Colonial Genocide, 11-12.
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John Docker, “Raphaël Lemkin’s History of Genocide and Colonialism,” (unpublished paper, Washington, D.C.,
February 26, 2004), US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, accessed October 17,
2018, https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20040316-docker-lemkin.pdf.
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Whitt and Clarke, Bringing it Home, 271-272.
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Ibid., 273. Whitt and Clarke quote Patrick Wolfe’s observation that settler colonialism is not invariably genocidal; rather,
its genocidal potential is unleashed when the process of depriving indigenes of their ancestral lands and transferring
them to civilian-settlers is “put under pressure and is in crisis.” See Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the
Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 (December 2006), 402. McDonnell and Moses trace
the approval of mass killing as an appropriate response to native resistance to the Spanish and (later) to the English
political philosopher John Locke, who wrote that indigenous rebels had “declared war against all mankind, and
therefore may be destroyed as a lion or tiger, one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society or
security.” John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government (London: Routledge, 1884), 196-197, quoted in McDonnell and
Moses, Raphaël Lemkin, 69.
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Other scholars have documented this pattern in North America. Genocide historian Benjamin
Madley helpfully reminds us that the prolonged and internecine Modoc wars were launched
when a party of forty white trappers invited the Modoc to a feast in 1840. The “feast” was in
reality an ambush: as the Modoc sat eating, the trappers detonated a cannon, killing many of their
native guests. As Madley concludes, the trappers’ gratuitous and unprovoked massacre “primed
the Modoc to resist incursions.” This primal murder, in other words, was seared into the hearts
and minds of the Modoc during an early stage of their contact with Euro-Americans, embittering
their attitudes toward the newcomers and steeling their resistance. Modoc reprisals then became
a justification for their genocide. By the fall of 1855, Californians were openly demanding the total
eradication of the Modoc.17
Raphaël Lemkin believed settler colonialism was intimately connected with genocide. Although
it is often assumed that Lemkin devised his concept of genocide to cover Nazi atrocities during
World War II, in fact the elements of the offense, as Lemkin construed it, predate his systematic
elaboration of genocide in Axis Rule in Europe (1944).18 Furthermore, it is clear from both chapter 9
of Axis Rule and his unpublished writings, composed between the mid-1940s and his death in 1959,
particularly the notes he and his research assistant prepared for a never-completed world history
of genocide, that Lemkin intended his definition to apply to other mass exterminations, including
Euro-American interactions with North American Indians. In the exposition of his concept of
genocide, he was not bound by a narrow statutory formula. Despite his training as a jurist, Lemkin
would kick himself loose from the constrictive hermeneutics of legal formalism in favor of a broad
and allusive understanding of genocide. As we will see, at the heart of Lemkin’s concept was a
concern with the integrity and preservation of unique cultural forms—the very phenomena under
threat from civilian settler colonialism. Lemkin’s surprisingly non-legalistic conception of genocide
is rooted less in 20th century legal developments than in the European Romanticism of Johann
Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Karl von Savigny. While law was the integument of his concept, the
urge to protect cultural ways of being in the world was its life-blood.
Lemkin’s Concept of Genocide: from Madrid to Axis Rule in Europe
Barbarity and Vandalism
While Lemkin would over time extend his conception of genocide beyond Nazism, Hitler’s
persecution of German Jews in the months following his appointment as chancellor was the
impetus to Lemkin’s first major public statement on a proposed type of international crime that
clearly foreshadowed his subsequent definition of genocide. In his autobiography, he wrote that
he and his colleagues at the Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP) were concerned that
Hitler would transform his anti-Semitic rantings in Mein Kampf into policy, now that the Nazis
had seized power in Germany. Lemkin continued: “Now was the time to outlaw the destruction
of national, racial and religious groups.”19 In the fall of 1933, he drafted a proposal to be delivered
at the 5th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law in Madrid, Spain. His proposal identified
five “new types of crimes”20 under international law; of the five, two of them, “barbarity” and
“vandalism,” are relevant for us here.

17

Benjamin Madley, “California and Oregon’s Modoc Indians: How Indigenous Resistance Camouflages Genocide in
Colonial Histories,” in Colonial Genocide in Indigenous North America, ed. Andrew Woolford et al., 107.

18

Dominik Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer contend that the destruction of the Armenians during World War I was the
stimulus to the young Lemkin’s belief in the need for an international law criminalizing “the wholesale extermination
of ethnic and religious groups.” Schaller and Zimmerer, introduction to The Origins of Genocide: Raphael Lemkin as a
historian of mass violence, ed. Dominik J. Schaller and Jürgen Zimmerer, (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-8.

19

Quoted in Douglas Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin and the Concept of Genocide (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2017), 45.

20

The five proposed crimes were: “a) acts of barbarity, b) acts of vandalism, c) provocation of catastrophes in international
communications, d) intentional interruption of international communications, e) propagation of human, animal
or vegetable contagions.” Raphaël Lemkin, “Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as
Offences Against the Law of Nations,” in Actes de la Vème Conférence Internationale Pour l’Unification du Droit Pénal, ed.
Jimenez de Asua, et al. (Paris: A. Pedone, 1935), accessed October 17, 2018, http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/
madrid1933-english.htm.
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For Lemkin, barbarity was a crime that attacked individuals for the purpose of harming the
“collectivity” to which they belonged. Hence, barbarity does harm not only to the person but to
his or her group. It consists of “acts of extermination directed against the ethnic, religious or social
collectivities, whatever the motive (political, religious, etc.); for example, massacres, pogroms,
actions undertaken to ruin the economic existence of the members of a collectivity, etc.” Because
such acts “endanger both the existence of the collectivity concerned and the entire social order,”
Lemkin urged the international community to criminalize them by means of an international
convention.21
The second kind of collective assault Lemkin called vandalism. Where barbarity tended to
focus on physical attacks on persons based on group membership, vandalism was a “systematic and
organized destruction of the art and cultural heritage in which the unique genius and achievement
of a collectivity are revealed in fields of science, arts and literature.” The interest Lemkin sought
to protect by criminalizing vandalism was “world culture,” insofar as individual cultures made
unique contributions that enriched all of humankind. When these cultures and their artifacts were
destroyed, “it is also all humanity which experiences a loss by this act of vandalism.”22
What bound together the crimes of barbarity and vandalism in Lemkin’s early thinking about
genocide was the nature of the attack: in both cases, the assault was directed against a cultural entity,
at either a physical (barbarity) or spiritual/cultural (vandalism) level. Physical extermination was
one technique of annihilating a group. However, even in this incipient stage of Lemkin’s thought,
the physical act of killing was simply one way to achieve a more insidious end—the obliteration of
a unique collectivity and its culture. The legal good that Lemkin exhorted the world community
to protect, by recognizing barbarity and vandalism as international crimes, was the manifold and
intricate life of a culture. He advised the world community to criminalize these offenses because
the destruction of cultures robbed human civilization of the invaluable and, indeed, irreplaceable
riches that only these aggregates of human sociality might provide.
The Influence of European Romanticism on Lemkin: The Defense of Particularity
I would suggest that in his paramount concern with the well-being and continuance of group
identities, Lemkin was inspired less by the criminal-legal dogmatics of his era than by a strain of
European thought rooted in Romanticism, particularly the thought of the German philosopher
Johann Gottfried von Herder. In Lemkin’s Madrid paper and his later exposition of genocide
in chapter 9 of Axis Rule, his deep appreciation for the incommensurability of cultures evokes
Herder’s defense of cultural heritage as the highest good in human history. For Herder, as for
Lemkin, the defense of culture was not restricted purely to its Western forms; rather, it extended
to the indigenous civilizations encountered by the West, which had already become the victims of
European domination starting in the 16th century. According to intellectual historian Isaiah Berlin,
from Herder’s belief in every culture’s Schwerpunkt (center of gravity) sprung his “passionate
concern with the preservation of primitive cultures which have a unique contribution to make,
his love of almost every expression of the human spirit, work of the imagination, for simply being
what it is.”23
For Herder, the teeming customs, languages, and folkways of humankind contributed to the
realization of “a common Humanität” (humanity) that enriched everyone’s lives by enabling all
people to become more fully human. Humanity, in other words, was not a static suppositum, the
sum total of persons bearing unalterable traits, but a dynamic, evolving, and emergent phenomenon
that achieves more fully human qualities over time and with each contribution rendered to it by the
various cultures in the world. Hence, cultures must not be tampered with; they should be allowed
to grow naturally and organically. Berlin contends that Herder’s belief in cultural inviolability—
his “relativistic passion for the individual essence and flavor of each culture”—cast a wide net of

Ibid.
Ibid.
23
Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 254.
21
22
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influence over modern European thought.24 One thinker caught in that net was Raphaël Lemkin,
whose mature concept of genocide as it takes shape in chapter 9 of Axis Rule in Europe evinces a
distinctly Romantic commitment to the local and specific.
Lemkin’s Mature Concept of Genocide in Axis Rule (1944)
Genocide scholar Douglas Irvin-Erickson has argued that the destruction of culture per se was not
genocide in Lemkin’s estimation. Rather, it was the destruction of nations that fulfilled his definition
of genocide—nations understood as “aspects of consciousness that took on a social reality as a
‘family of mind’ between individuals…”25 The destruction of culture might facilitate the nation’s
destruction and thus become a technique of genocide, but it was not in itself an instance of genocide.
Specifically, Irvin-Erickson writes, “genocide was the destruction of the family of mind.”26 While
Irvin-Erickson’s assertion is well-taken, passages of Lemkin’s chef d’oeuvre, Axis Rule in Europe,
strongly suggest that it was indeed individual cultures—including those of indigenous peoples
imperiled by civilian settlers in North America—which Lemkin was striving to protect. In order to
grasp the nature of what Lemkin wanted to preserve through the criminalization of genocide, we
must examine in some depth his development of the concept in chapter 9 of Axis Rule.
An arresting feature of Lemkin’s concept of genocide in both 1933 and 1944 is its independence
of the physical act of killing. As he wrote in Axis Rule, genocide is “a coordinated plan of different
actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the
aim of annihilating the groups themselves.”27 The aim of group destruction might be accomplished
through mass killings of group members, but such direct physical attacks were neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition of genocide. This may seem surprising to those familiar with the UN
Genocide Convention’s definition, which interprets genocide almost entirely in terms of the
physical destruction of group members. By contrast, it is the annihilation of a group’s way of life
that chiefly interests Lemkin.28
Lemkin’s paramount concern with attacks on a group’s way of life, committed with the intent
to eradicate it, emerges from “the phases” into which he organizes the process of genocide. In the
first phase, we witness the destruction of the “national pattern of the oppressed group.” In the
second, we encounter “the imposition…of the national pattern of the oppressor.” Lemkin contends
that such “imposition” may be inflicted on an oppressed group allowed to remain in the conquered
territory, or it may occur after the oppressed group has been removed from the land and the newly
acquired territory has been colonized with the oppressors’ own citizens. Lemkin’s schematization
of genocide into these two phases already assumes a situation of military conflict: an outright war
between different states, a civil war in which a dominant group seeks to exterminate a minority
group, or a colonial war involving a colonizer that attacks indigenous peoples, either ejecting them
from their land and re-filling it with the colonizers’ own nationals or allowing the vanquished to
remain, but only on the condition that they accept the colonizers’ “national pattern.”29
24

Ibid., 255.

25

Irvin-Erickson, Raphaël Lemkin, 221.

26

Ibid., 222. Irvin-Erickson writes that “culture, in Lemkin’s definition, was a functional, structural force that integrated
individuals into social groups to provide for people’s basic needs.” Ibid., 221-222. How this definition operationally
differs from the construal of nations as a “family of mind” remains obscure in Lemkin’s thinking, at least for this
writer. I will suggest in the present essay that it was to culture and its defense that Lemkin ultimately rallied. The
integrity of the individual culture and its preservation in the face of exterminatory attack were the “legal good”
(Rechtsgut) Lemkin sought to vindicate.

27

Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

28

Lemkin’s capacious understanding of genocide invited criticism early on from his colleagues Vespasian V. Pella and
Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, both of whom worked with Lemkin on the draft of what became the UN Genocide
Convention. Pella and de Vabres regarded Lemkin’s cultural theory of genocide as an ill-conceived embellishment on
the concept. Moreover, they differed with Lemkin’s view that forced assimilation was genocide (although they agreed
on the genocidal character of forcible transfers of a group’s children into another group). Schaller and Zimmerer, ed.,
introduction to The Origins of Genocide, 5.

29

Lemkin, Axis Rule in Europe. Note that the last of these military situations conducive to genocidal outcomes resembles
the plight of North American Indians, particularly after 1871.
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The elimination of a “national pattern” and its replacement by the pattern of the dominant
group may be effected through several techniques. In Chapter 9 of Axis Rule, Lemkin explicitly
links these techniques to German occupation policy. However, it is equally clear that they are also
applicable to settler relations with North American Indians—a connection Lemkin will draw in
the years following publication of Axis Rule as he researched his planned treatise on genocide in
world history. Perpetrators of genocide use these techniques to install the oppressor’s “national
pattern” in the fields of politics, society, culture, the economy, biology, “the physical,” religion,
and morality. In politics, Lemkin considered Germany’s abolition of local governmental structures
in occupied Europe and their replacement by “a German pattern of administration” a genocidal
action. In society, the Germans had sought to reconfigure Poland and Slovenia by combing each
nation of its intelligentsia and clergy—i.e., those most able to organize resistance to Nazi rule—and
sending them to Germany as forced laborers. In the cultural sphere, the Germans forbade the Poles
and other nations under the Nazi yoke from either teaching or publishing in their native language.
For the national pattern of an indigenous language, the Nazis substituted the commandment
that only German could be used as the “language of instruction” in the schools of some of the
nations they occupied. The national patterns of these countries would be further disrupted by the
assignment to their schools of German instructors who were obliged to promote Nazi ideals in
their pedagogy.30
In the economy, the Germans adopted policies to expropriate Jews and Poles and transfer
their wealth into German hands, with the aim of slashing their standard of living and raising
obstacles to their “fulfilling cultural-spiritual requirements.” Because citizens of Luxembourg
were considered racially compatible with Germans, they were given the opportunity to work on
behalf of the Nazi occupation; if they declined to cooperate, their property was confiscated and
redistributed to compliant Luxembourgers. In the “biological” realm, the Nazis strove to prevent
non-German population growth in the occupied territories while encouraging the reproduction of
ethnic Germans. They deterred non-Aryan procreation by breaking up the families of disfavored
groups and deporting the men to slave labor. Harsh rationing imposed on these groups led to
malnourishment of the parents and a concomitant increase in infant mortality. At the same time,
subsidies were awarded to ethnic German families with at least three children in Poland; in
the Netherlands and Norway, “Aryan” women impregnated by German soldiers also received
additional support.31
In Lemkin’s taxonomy, the physical aspect of genocide closely resembles his discussion of the
biological field. Here we encounter again efforts to annihilate national groups by means of “racial
discrimination in feeding.” At the top of the food pyramid were, of course, the Germans, who
received 100% of their pre-war calories, followed by national groups entitled to food allocation
based on their racial affinities with the Germans. On the lowest rung of the consumption ladder
were the Jews, who received 27% of the carbohydrates, 20% of the proteins, and 0.32% of the fat
they had consumed before the war. “Racial feeding” was the first subcategory of physical genocide;
the second was “endangering of health,” e.g., seizing warm clothes and blankets from persecuted
groups or denying them access to firewood and medicine during the winter, and the third, “mass
killings” (such as the liquidation by firing squads of the intelligentsia in Poland, Bohemia-Moravia,
and Slovenia). In religion, the Nazis undermined the national life of the nations they occupied
through persecution of the Catholic Church. Finally, the Nazis assailed the moral foundations of
the Polish nation by “creat[ing] an atmosphere of moral debasement within this group.” Their
purpose was “to weaken the spiritual resistance” of the Poles to German domination. Lemkin
claims that the Germans imposed pornographic movies and media on them and encouraged their
consumption of alcohol. A Pole could avoid strict Nazi curfew laws by presenting a casino ticket
to a German policeman. For Lemkin, in fastening their attention on “base instincts,” the Poles were
“diverted from moral and national thinking.”32
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Within these eight types of genocide, direct physical killing appears consistently in only one
of them, the “physical” category and its subtype “mass killings.” Religious forms of genocide
may also involve direct killing, such as the murder of priests in concentration camps, but just as
frequently, they express themselves in non-homicidal practices like encouraging Polish youth to
renounce their Catholic faith. The point of our analysis is that Lemkin in his 1944 book, thought
of genocide in terms well beyond mass killing. When winnowed down to its essence, genocide for
Lemkin has to do with destroying the conditions that make group identity possible. Certainly, the
Gordian knot of identity may be cut by simply murdering the members of the group. Although
the Germans committed mass murder on a scale rarely glimpsed in world history, physical killing
was only one means employed in furtherance of a greater aim: the liquidation of groups en masse
whom the Nazis considered inferior. Their assault on racial “enemies” is so shocking to us because
it displayed a malignant ingenuity in the choice of techniques to erase entire peoples and their
folkways from the face of the earth. To borrow a phrase from journalist Ron Rosenbaum, at the
heart of Nazi evil is a “demonic connoisseurship”33 that targeted entire national, religious, ethnic,
and racial groups for annihilation, most infamously the Jews but also the Poles, the mentally
handicapped, the Roma, homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and many others. What is crucial for
Lemkin is the destruction of the national pattern of these groups and its replacement by the pattern
of the Nazi occupiers.
Elimination of a group’s pattern and its supersession by another: this is the whorled fingerprint
of genocide, the unique quality that, for Lemkin, distinguished the “crime of crimes” from other
atrocities in human history. Construing genocide in this fashion, Lemkin was able to extend his
model beyond Nazi criminality to identify other events that bore the telltale fingerprint of genocide.
Among them was the centuries-long conflict between Euro-American settlers and the indigenous
peoples of North America. That conflict, as Lemkin’s world genocide research indicates, unleashes
the genocidal potential within democratic societies when native peoples stand between a colonizing
majority and coveted lands. In short, not only repressive or totalitarian societies committed
genocide. Under the proper circumstances, democracies might also commit it—not because the
people mindlessly obey an overpowering authority but because the people will it.
Genocide Beyond Nazism: Lemkin’s Concept as applied to Settler – Indian Relations on the
North American Frontier
Lemkin’s World History of Genocide34
In the years following Axis Rule in Europe until his death in 1959, Lemkin embarked on an
ambitious project that, had it been completed as planned, would likely have eclipsed Axis Rule
as the crowning scholarly achievement of his life. The project was a three-volume exploration
of genocide in world history. He was planning the book as early as fall 1947 (in November he
received a letter discouraging his application to secure funding for the project from the Rockefeller
Foundation).35 The purpose of his treatise, in Lemkin’s own words, was “to prove that genocide is
not an exceptional phenomenon, but that it occurs in intergroup relations with a certain regularity,
like homicide takes place in relations between individuals.”36 Eventually, Lemkin acquired a term
position teaching criminal law at Yale University Law School. In addition to his salary, he received
financial support from Yale in the form of an office, typing facilities, and a research assistant.
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Buoyed with this infusion as well as a subvention from the Viking Fund, Lemkin began his research
on March 1, 1948.37
At this stage of his research, Lemkin had gathered materials “on the following genocide cases:”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

The Early Christians
The Jews in the Middle Ages; the Jews in Tsarist Russia
The Morescos [sic] in Spain
The Indians in Latin America
The Valdenses [sic]
The Armenians
The Hugenots [sic]
The Greeks in Turkey
The Turks under Greek occupation in 1922
The Indians in North America (in part)

In his collection of data, Lemkin was guided by “headings covering physical, biological and
cultural genocide”—that is, categories of genocide he had analyzed only three years previously
in chapter 9 of Axis Rule. His plan was to focus “upon the role plaid [sic] by governments, groups
and individuals in the commission of the crime,” as well as on “the psychological and sociological
factors.”38
Although North American Indians appear at the end of Lemkin’s list of genocide cases, the
work of his research assistant in the spring of 1948 indicates the importance Lemkin attached to
the North American case study in his future history of genocide. At the end of May 1948, Lemkin’s
assistant summarized his research into Euro-American/Indian relations in North America, which
included:
•
•
•
•

Liquor sales to native peoples and Indian slavery
Genocide committed on the Plains Indians and California Indians
Land cessions “and its genocidal aspects”
The aftermath of “southern removal cases” [presumably, Cherokee and
Choctaw removal]
• General Amherst’s alleged efforts to distribute smallpox-infested blankets to
the Indians
• Indian responses39
The sub-topic of “genocide against the Plains Indians and the California Indians” invites
further scrutiny. Under Plains Indians, Lemkin’s research assistant subsumed the Sand Creek
massacre; the Washita massacre; the Wounded Knee massacre; the targeted annihilation of the
buffalo “to starve Indians;” banning “tribal culture” on reservations; depriving native peoples of
food; and the practice of allotting land to Indians qua individuals so as “to destroy tribal life.”
Under California Indians, he listed the expulsion by force of native peoples into “barren mountains
where I[ndians] starved” and “wanton murder and militar[y] action against Indians who refused
to leave, rebelled or returned occasionally to get food.” While some aspects of these subtopics
involve federal or state governmental policies, others relate directly to civilian-settler genocide
against indigenous peoples. This is particularly true for the genocide of California Indians in the
latter half of the nineteenth century.

37

AJHS, Report on the preparation of a volume on Genocide, March-May 1948; Paul Fejos to Lemkin, May 10, 1948.

38

AJHS, Report.

39

AJHS, Research assistant to Lemkin, May 25, 1948.

©2020

Genocide Studies and Prevention 14, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.14.1.1632

Bryant

30

Settler Genocide in California
In California, the annihilation of native peoples was more a local than a federally guided event.
California governors beginning in January 1851 warned that further Indian depredations on settlers
would lead to a “war of extermination…waged between the races until the Indian race becomes
extinct.” One governor, employing the language of criminal extortion, threatened the Indians
with “extermination” if they did not surrender their lands. California newspapers echoed the
drumbeat of genocide. An 1856 editorial published in a San Francisco newspaper recommended
“extermination” as “the quickest and cheapest remedy” for Indian mischief.40
The California example illustrates the impossibility of cleanly separating government from
settler-instigated genocide. In fact, in California, the two levels of action were braided and mutually
supportive. A California governor might hurl threats of extirpation at Indians, but we should recall
that he was elected by civilian-settlers, and the resonance of his threats in newspaper editorials both
expressed and shaped the attitudes of these settlers in their conduct with native peoples. When
California legislators in 1850 declared the forced indenturement of Indian children legal, they were
acting in accordance with the wishes of the population who had elected them. The enslavement
of California Indians proved to be a potent force in their destruction. Operating in a zone of near
total impunity for crimes against Indians, settler-slavers murdered native parents and abducted
their children, who were then sold into slavery. By 1860, the California legislature had enlarged the
period of forced indentures and extended them to native adults. The upshot was an enslavement
of some 10,000 California Indians. The entire juvenile population of some Indian tribes in northern
California was abducted and indentured.41
Along with enslavement, the mass killing of California Indians decimated their numbers.
Although federal troops perpetrated the inaugural two massacres of natives (the first killing 120200 Yana Indians in 1846, the second 135-200 Pomo in 1850), local militia groups and volunteers
accounted for the lion’s share of Indian deaths after 1849. Yet, in the mass killings of California
Indians by local settler groups, the interaction of center and periphery, again, acquired a lethal
synergy. Under the 1855 Bounty Land Law, the US government granted 160 acres of land to both
federal and private soldiers involved in military conflicts, including “the survivors of the militia, or
volunteers, or State troops of any State or Territory” who received federal money and participated
in combat.42 Wittingly or not, the US Congress had incentivized the physical destruction of
California’s native population. Between passage of the bounty law and 1868, some northern
California tribes were almost completely exterminated. Hardly any of the 2 to 3,000 Yana Indians
remained after a wave of settler-militia attacks reduced their number to 100 survivors. Over the
course of a decade (1854-64), the Yuki population was thinned from 12,000 to 600. Genocide scholar
Ben Kiernan quotes a settler’s recollection of killing sorties he and other settlers conducted against
the Yuki: “…[I]n 1856 the first expedition by the whites against the Indians was made…there were
so many of these expeditions…we would kill on average fifty or sixty Indians on a trip…frequently
we would have to turn out two or three times a week.” The ubiquitous pattern of genocide replayed
in California much as it did throughout the North American continent: settler encroachments on
Indian lands led to Indian raids on settler livestock, which invited the indiscriminate killing of
Indian men, women, and children by settler militias. The Petaluma Journal of April 1857 reported
on one such episode: “[W]ithin the past three weeks, from 300 to 400 bucks, squaws, and children
have been killed by the whites.” Two years later, the commander of the local garrison described
Euro-American settler reaction to a Yuki killing of two settlers in September 1859: “The whites
have waged a relentless war of extermination against the Yukas, making no distinction between the
innocent and the guilty. They have relentlessly massacred men, women and children…”43
Euro-Americans dressed up these mass killings of indigenous peoples in the language of licit
warfare. Such martialization of noncombatant slaughter has a dispiritingly long pedigree in Western
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colonialism. Benjamin Madley compares the California Modoc wars to similar episodes in Africa,
Australia, and throughout the Americas. On all these continents, the colonizers denominated as
“wars” the armed conflicts arising from native resistance to colonial domination. For Madley, the
misleading nomenclature conceals their true nature as “both genocides and wars of resistance.”
As his sobering anatomy of the seven anti-Modoc campaigns between 1851-73 suggests, the term
“war” hardly befits the retaliatory killing of native men, women, and children for offenses they had
little or nothing to do with. Indiscriminate massacre extended even to Modoc delegates invited by
the whites to a peace conference in 1852. The delegates, who had voluntarily disarmed as a token
of good will, were subsequently gunned down by their hosts. The settlers thereafter referred to the
murder of the unarmed peace delegates as a “battle.” Grotesque misrepresentations like this one
camouflage genocide with the linguistic cover of military operations.44
As the nation edged toward the Civil War, the mass murder of California Indians became
rampant. When an Indian was alleged to have killed a horse in 1859, the Euro-American bounty
hunter H. L. Hall mounted a settler posse to exact retribution, murdering 240 native men, women,
and children. The killings of women and children were deliberate and calculated and reposed
on Hall’s justification that “a nit would make a louse” (that is, Indian children had to be killed to
prevent the future reproduction of more unwanted Indians). Before the expedition was mounted,
Hall interviewed volunteers, rejecting any who voiced compunction about killing Indian women
and children. He later said about the massacre that “all the squaws were killed because they refused
to go further. We took one boy into the valley, and the infants were put out of their misery, and a
girl ten years of age was killed for stubbornness.” By 1860, California’s superintendent of Indian
Affairs could relate that “the killing of Indians is a daily occurrence,” and the following year,
the new superintendent reported that Indians “are now being hunted down like wild beasts and
killed” by settlers in actions like the December 1862 massacre of 108 native people.45
Settler-indigenous interactions in Oregon reflected an analogous pattern. The August 1853
death of a miner in southwestern Oregon became the occasion for settler resolutions demanding (as
a contemporary observer wrote) “the Extermination of the Indian race.” The head of a speculators’
group, named Miller, coveted land on the south bank of the Chetko Indians’ land. When the
Chetko denied him his request, he and his posse attacked and killed fifteen Chetko and torched
their villages. Because the Chetko were not legally qualified to testify against Miller in court, he
was able to consolidate his claim to the south bank land. With their backs pressed against the wall,
the Chetko conducted winter raids simply to stay alive, in the course of which eleven Chetko had
been killed by 1854. These and similar raids by Oregon’s indigenous population bolstered the
settlers’ calls for outright annihilation of native populations. Much as in the case of the Modocs, all
indigenous persons were targets of extermination whether or not they posed a threat to the lives
of whites. Local militias killed not only Indians accused of raiding livestock but “friendly Indians”
(in this case, natives living under peace treaties with the federal government). The cold-blooded
murder of as many as 106 friendly Indians had the predictable effect of provoking war with other
native groups. In short, as historian Gray Whaley has observed, the local militias and their civilian
supporters did not want amicable relations with native peoples; they “wanted extermination, not
treaty settlements,” and their indiscriminate attacks on native men, women, and children fomented
military conflict with them.46
For Whaley, the concept of “settler colonialism” has limited explanatory value. He instead
prefers the term “settler folk imperialism,” which furnished the “ideological framework” within
44
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which white settlers came to accept the genocide of native peoples as an option preferable to
assimilation. The ideology of folk imperialism offered an influential rationale for genocide,
holding that total eradication of native peoples would serve the well-being of settler communities.
Stoked with this folk imperialism, local militia leaders and their men, the Oregon press, and state
politicians all clamored for the extermination of Oregon’s native population. When the US Army
opposed this policy (the federal government supported assimilation of native peoples), Oregon
newspapers renewed their demands for physical annihilation, berating the army for its softness
and issuing pleas to President Franklin Pierce to sack the Commanding General of US forces in the
Oregon Territory, John Wool, who had proven a vocal critic of militia attacks on Indians.47
By 1860, California’s Indian population had declined from 100,000 to 32,000 under the
pressures of slavery and mass murder. Even then, genocide continued to engulf Native Americans.
Bounties for Indian scalps advertised in local newspapers launched new waves of mass murder
from 1859 to 1861 as claimants brought mountains of their grisly relics to the state legislature for
redemption. Nor were friendly Indians, like the Wiyots on Indian Island, safe from extermination:
in an unprovoked attack, settler volunteers murdered nearly all of the Wiyot women and children.
Although these and other assaults on Indians were often committed by settlers, federal troops (who
had refused to support militia actions against native peoples in Oregon) sometimes intervened—in
support of Indian killing. A federal investigator wrote that “[U.S.] troops were sent out to aid the
settlers in slaughtering the Indians.” He continued:
By means of mounted howitzers, muskets, Minie rifles, dragoon pistols, and sabers, a good
many were cut to pieces. But on the whole, the general policy of the government was pacific.
It was not designed to kill any more Indians than might be necessary to secure the adhesion
of the honest yeomanry of the state.48

While we cannot prove it from the scant documentary evidence at our disposal, it seems
likely that Lemkin had such incidents in mind as he pondered his study of genocide in world
history. His research assistant’s reference to the “forceful eviction from fertile valleys into barren
mountains where I[ndians] starved” assuredly alludes to the widespread practice in California of
native eviction from ancestral lands into areas inhospitable to agriculture or hunting/gathering.49
When starving native peoples raided settler livestock in a desperate effort to survive, they were
butchered in droves by settler militias. Similarly, the “wanton murder and milit[ary] action against
Indians who refused to leave, rebelled or returned occasionally to get food” mentioned in the
memorandum to Lemkin implicates civilian-settlers in the genocide of native peoples.
A Closer Look at Lemkin’s Thinking about Settler Genocide in North America
The “southern removal cases (aftermath),” “failure…to protect reservations against white intrusion,”
and “land cessions” referenced in the research memo all involve contributions by civilian settlers
to Native American extermination. Unlike the example of the California and Oregon Indians,
however, the perpetrators in the actions above frequently used techniques of genocide other than
physical killing. Lemkin derived these techniques from his taxonomy of genocide in chapter 9
of Axis Rule, transferring them from Nazi occupation policy to the North American frontier. The
“southern removal cases” demonstrate the inextricable relationship between federal authorities,
state governments, and settler demands for Indian land in the process of Native American
extermination. Reflecting an amalgam of Lemkin’s political, physical, and economic techniques of
genocide, southern governments acting on Congress’s Federal Indian Removal Law of 1830—a law
passed, in President Andrew Jackson’s words to the Choctaws, “to sustain the States in the exercise
47
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of their right” to seize native lands—nullified tribal governments, laws, and elective bodies. They
imposed taxes on Indian communities, deprived them of the right to vote or testify at trial, and
sold Indian land to white settlers. The memorandum sent to Lemkin by his research assistant cites
the “aftermath” of removal as a special focus of the planned chapter on North American genocide.
The aftermath, of course, was mass death of Indians evicted from their lands on the trek westward,
in the course of which 20% of the Choctaw nation and as much as 25% of the eastern Cherokees
perished. 700 of the 3,000 Creeks expelled from Alabama died during their forced march. Many
Indian victims succumbed to the harsh conditions of the journey to Oklahoma, while others were
carried away by cholera outbreaks; however, thousands were killed by federal troops and militia
members during roundups.50
Direct killing of native peoples during roundups preparatory to expulsion falls within the
physical type of genocide identified by Lemkin in Axis Rule, i.e., genocide by means of “endangering
of health” and “mass killings.” The abolition of tribal government and law, however, would match
his description of political genocide. Seizure of and expulsion of native peoples from their ancestral
lands, on the other hand, meet the criteria of the economic form of genocide (“the destruction of
the foundations of the economic existence of a national group [that] necessarily brings about a
crippling of its development”).51 In short, as he planned his three-volume history, Lemkin was
mapping his categories of genocide from Axis Rule onto the interactions between Euro-Americans
and native peoples.52
The nexus between land policy and genocide is particularly complex in Lemkin’s approach
to the American frontier. In his assistant’s memo, we read the following summary of research
conducted:
Obtained material on land-cessions and its genocidal aspects (on cards).
Comparison of land policies of various colonial powers
Land policy of US. – Treaty-making and breaking. Failure to provide for uprooted Indians,
to protect reservations against white intrusion. The legal fiction.53

What did Lemkin’s assistant mean by “the legal fiction?” The phrase appears again on a
handwritten notecard, ostensibly prepared by this same researcher, on which we read:
Indians (non-Spain)
Policy towards I[ndians] – post colonial
Treaties – were made as in colonial period
U.S. gov’t recognizing I[ndian] land titles. [99]
Congress had jurisdiction over all Indian affairs.
In 1871 – fiction of Indian nationhood abandoned. Thereafter “agreements” not treaties were
made. [see p. 100 for examples of treaties].
By 1890 most Amer. land was in white hands [107].
Land cessions left no provision for settlement of displaced I[ndians] [107].54 (emphasis added)

What the author of the notecard refers to is the decision by Congress in 1871 to deprive Indians
of their status under law as nations eligible to negotiate treaties with the federal government. The
50
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text of the law reads: “[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe…shall be acknowledged or recognized
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”55
As a result, the federal government was able to seize native lands without their consent (which
would have been required if Indians enjoyed legally protected rights as sovereign nations). Legal
scholar William Bradford relates the fate of native peoples in the aftermath of this Congressional
decree:
Scores of tribes, their numbers reduced by war, disease, and starvation, were forced onto
land reservations in the 1870s and 1880s. The surviving three hundred members of the last
belligerents, the Chiricahua Apache, surrendered unconditionally in 1887 after the murder
of three thousand of their number.56

At the same time, as tribes like the Chiricahua were decimated and forced onto reservations,
Indian territory disappeared into the hands of Euro-Americans avid for cheap land. In 1887,
138 million of the 2 billion acres of the US landmass were tribal lands. By 1934, Indian holdings
had declined by 90 million acres in a process that Bradford calls “legal theft.”57 Lemkin was
unquestionably aware of this context of expropriation leading to the destruction of native patterns
of existence as the substance of his three-volume world history ripened in his mind, nor can there
be much doubt that he regarded land cession in North America as genocidal.
We ought not lose sight of the fact that abandonment of the “legal fiction of Indian nationhood,”
while effected by federal law at the center, was driven by civilian-settlers at the periphery. So
long as settlers voted in national elections, they could influence Washington’s policies. This
was certainly the case in the destruction of native peoples in California, where federal troops
reinforced settler militias in their wars against Indian men, women, and children. It was equally
true as a propulsive force behind the Congressional Act of 1871 stripping Indians of their status
as sovereign nations. Passage of the Homestead Act of 1862 (giving 160 acres of public land to
adult US citizens who were heads of households for a nominal fee) could not blunt the ravenous
demands of settlers for more land, which would now come at the Indians’ expense. Settler pressure
eventuated in passage of the 1871 Act and further plunder of native holdings. This history exposes
as an untenable falsehood the 1953 statement of the U.S. solicitor general that genocide “has never
existed in this country” because it was impossible “under our form of government.” As Lemkin
himself understood, genocide not only could happen in the USA, it did happen there, and precisely
because of democratic pressures that induced the federal government and state governments to
bow to the expressed will of the people. In Lemkin’s view by the late 1940s if not before, American
democracy was sometimes genocidal.
Conclusion
Several conclusions follow from the argument of this essay. First, it is clear that Lemkin’s concept
of genocide existed in embryo as early as 1933 and that, while the racist chauvinism expressed
in Mein Kampf and Nazi persecution of German Jews were significant stimuli of it, the essential
features of Lemkin’s idea were not exclusive to Nazism. Second, both Lemkin’s Madrid paper
and chapter 9 of Axis Rule limned a concept of genocide in which the destruction of a group’s
national pattern, rather than the physical killing of its members, was the decisive factor. Third,
when we read these two sources in juxtaposition with Lemkin’s notes for his treatise on the world
history of genocide, his belief that Euro-American treatment of native Americans was genocidal
is manifest. Fourth, the conduct Lemkin identified as evidence of genocide in the notes for his
uncompleted study often involved the actions of civilian-settlers on the frontier, who were able to
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harm native peoples through their own violent attacks or by proxy, such as importuning federal
and state authorities to do their bidding. From this premise, we may infer that Lemkin believed
civilian-settlers committed genocide on the North American frontier.
What was the harm these civilian-settlers did? As legal scholar David Luban argues, and as
Lemkin putatively thought, the harm inflicted by genocide exceeds “the loss of the slaughtered
individuals” but represents “an attack on human group plurality itself.” Genocide is the “crime of
crimes” for a reason: it “diminishes humanity” by robbing it of a group’s “ways of life, imaginative
visions of the good worked out collectively…”58 As Lemkin himself wrote in Axis Rule, “the
destruction of a nation…results in the loss of its future contributions to the world.”59 The victim,
then, is as much the world community as the shattered group itself. Douglas Irvin-Erickson identifies
the legal good Lemkin was striving to defend as “national-cultural diversity” or “people’s ability
to freely exercise their subjectivity.”60 Irvin-Erickson quotes Lemkin’s remark that “world culture
is like a subtle concerto” that “is nourished and gets life from the tone of every instrument.”61 This
conception of the interest at stake in the criminalization of genocide—namely, cultural diversity,
freely expressed subjectivity, the nourishing of world culture through the individual cultures
constituting it—reveals Lemkin as an intellectual scion of the great nineteenth century German
historicists, Herder and (in jurisprudence) Friedrich Karl von Savigny.62 Like them, Lemkin wanted
to protect the distinctive ethos of cultures (the Volksgeist, or “spirit of a people,” as Savigny termed
it), which were singular and irreducible. North American settlers laid under siege this inestimably
precious good.
For genocide scholar Patrick Wolfe, settler colonialism was not inevitably genocidal; it tended
to become so only when the dispossession of native peoples was “in crisis.”63 Whitt and Clarke
suggest, by contrast, that settler colonialism was inherently genocidal.64 So long as Indians occupied
land that settlers coveted, the antagonists tended to move with mounting velocity toward genocidal
outcomes. According to Gray Whaley, on the Oregon and California frontiers the assimilationist
policy of a relatively weak federal authority yielded to a crudely utilitarian folk imperialism, one
marked by an ideology of absolute destruction of native peoples.65 Settlers had arrived at the belief
that genocide was desirable if it served their interests.
A dynamic internal to settler colonialism seems to push it toward genocide. Lemkin
understood—perhaps with an eye on Tolstoy’s dictum (in Anna Karenina) that “every unhappy
family is unhappy in its own way”—that every genocide developed its own constellation of
motives, in which hatred toward the victims might be incidental. “Lemkin’s point,” writes IrvinErickson, “was that often it was the benefits gained through genocide—not primordial hatred—
that led people to support a genocide, to commit a genocide, or even to develop group hatreds
and kill. This, of course, meant that every individual who participated in a genocide did so for a
different reason.”66
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While there is much truth in Lemkin’s assertion, settler violence toward Indians usually
involved the desire for something the Indians possessed: land, resources, game, water, or—much
later, in a sadly neglected episode in this elegiac history—oil. The journalist David Grann has
recently told the story of the serial murder of Osage Indians in 1920s Oklahoma.67 When oil was
discovered beneath their land, the Osage for a time became one of the wealthiest groups in the
world. Their new-found prosperity invited murderous schemes to wrest their property from them.
The story Grann narrates is important; however, it should be set within the wider context of the
fraud, kidnapping, and homicide that befell native peoples in “Indian country” long after the
frontier was closed in 1890.68 According to historian Angie Debo, “forgery, embezzlement, criminal
conspiracy, misuse of notary’s seals, and other crimes against Indian property continued with
monotonous regularity, but these grosser and slightly more dangerous forms of swindling were
not as common as…investing Indian money in worthless real estate, padding guardians’ accounts,
and allowing excessive fees to guardians and attorneys.”69 In the midst of such predation, murder,
too, became a commonplace of modern Indian life. Legal scholar Rennard Strickland has referred
to the use of the law to destroy native lives and cultures as “genocide-by-law,”70 an appellation
with which Lemkin would likely have been in agreement. Debo writes:
Some spectacular crimes occurred, such as the dynamiting of two Negro children as they
slept, in order that the conspirators might secure title to their Glenn Pool [oil] property by
forged deeds; and many sinister stories were told of Indians who died under suspicious
circumstances after bequeathing their property to white men. An epidemic of such deaths
broke out among aged Choctaws…, and the Federal officials became convinced of an
organized plot whereby the Indian made out a will to the land dealers in return for a tendollar monthly pension for the remainder of his life. A suspicious fatality followed the making
of such wills, and in several cases carbolic acid or ground glass was found on the premises.
Several prominent real estate dealers were arrested, but the mystery of the Choctaw murders
was never solved.71

Is it too much to see in this appalling chronicle of human evil the spoor of the frontier settler? I
don’t think so. The mentality of Euro-American settlers coalesced through a good century or more
of interaction with Indians, during which settlers in one generation after another seized Indian
possessions for themselves, often doing so violently and with impunity. This mindset did not
vanish when the frontier closed. Instead, it persisted well into the 20th century in the form of the
ghastly abuses Debo retails.
Lemkin never finished what would likely have been his magnum opus, his three-volume
world history of genocide. He died of a massive heart attack on 42nd Street in New York City
on August 29, 1959, leaving behind only the fragmentary outlines and notecards of his chapter
devoted to genocide on the North American frontier. Six years before Lemkin’s death, another
figure interested in the historical mistreatment of the American Indian (and one who, like Lemkin,
died far too young) penned the words appearing as an epigraph to the present essay. Felix Cohen,
the architect of the “Indian New Deal” of the 1930s and the creator of modern Federal Indian Law
as a disciplinary field, was a fierce advocate of Native American rights. He likened the Indian in
American life to the Jews in Nazi Germany. For Cohen, the Indian was a “miner’s canary” much
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like the German Jew: how each was treated was a measure of a society’s political health.72 The
sickening of the miner’s canary betokened that society’s loss of faith in democracy.
Genocide in North America as Lemkin understood it opens Cohen’s metaphor in a different
direction. Rather than the sign of a flagging commitment to democracy, settler genocide shows
that popular government—government of the people, by the people, and for the people—can be as
repressive of minority groups as authoritarian or totalitarian systems, particularly in societies with
inadequate safeguards for their rights. Gray Whaley’s verdict about civilian genocide in Oregon
applies more generally to Euro-American encounters with native peoples: “The case of Oregon…
suggests that even a system premised on the natural rights of man could foster genocide when ‘the
people’ wield democratic values against those defined as outside the protection of those rights.”73
In a word, settler genocide reveals how illiberal democracy has sometimes been in the past and,
without vigilant legal protections for minority groups, may yet become in the future.
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